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Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy
JENNIFER MENSCH
Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2013
xii + 246 pp., ISBN 9780226021980, US$45.00 (hardback); ISBN 9780226022031,
US$7.00–36.00 (e-book)
In the last decades it has become common practice to interpret Kant’s theoretical phil-
osophy in relation to the sciences of his day. After Michael Friedman published his
seminal Kant and the Exact Sciences (1992), most scholars recognized that in order to
understand Kant’s critical philosophy one must carefully consider his lifelong attempts
to provide philosophical foundations of the (natural) sciences. Kant’s views on science
are often analysed by considering his discussions of mathematics, physics, and, more
recently, his reflections on chemistry (Friedman’s ‘exact sciences’). In addition, many
historians of philosophy and science have stressed Kant’s engagement with disciplines
such as history, physical geography, and anthropology. Kant’s philosophy of biology
has also received a lot of attention in recent years. There are now multiple monographs
and articles that highlight Kant’s interaction with the eighteenth-century life sciences.
In spite of the strong interest in Kant’s views on biology, the status of biology within
his philosophy remains problematic. Kant has been criticized for excluding biology
from the realm of science. After all, he denied that there could be a Newton of a
blade of grass. It is also not clear how Kant’s views on biology are related to his critical
philosophy, partly because Kant did not provide a detailed account of his views on the
foundations of biology. In light of such problems, historians of science such as Robert
Richards and John Zammito have argued that biology does not fit in Kant’s philosophy
of science.
Jennifer Mensch’s Kant’s Organicism provides a novel assessment of the place of the
life sciences in Kant’s critical philosophy. The main thesis of the book is that Kant’s
reflections on biology are crucial to his transcendental philosophy. This thesis is
argued for in a twofold way. First, Mensch provides a rich historical account of devel-
opments in the life sciences that influenced Kant during his intellectually formative
years. Drawing on a large amount of philosophical and scientific literature, including
Kant’s published writings, correspondence and Nachlass, she shows how Kant’s
engagement with the life sciences shaped his philosophical development up to the
publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). Second, Mensch argues that
epigenetic theories of organic generation shaped Kant’s theory of cognition as
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articulated in the first Critique. By arguing that Kant’s epistemological reflections must
be understood against the background of eighteenth-century biology, Mensch
attempts to show that biology is a central part of Kant’s critical system as a whole,
even if it is not a proper science for Kant.
In the first two chapters, Mensch provides a historical overview of philosophical and
biological debates that form the backdrop to Kant’s interests in the life sciences.
Chapter 1 is devoted to seventeenth-century debates, and discusses, among other
things, Locke’s views on organic generation and taxonomy as well as Leibniz’s endor-
sement of the pre-existence theory of generation. Turning to the eighteenth century,
chapter 2 covers Buffon’s Newtonian views on the scientific method, his explanation
of reproduction in terms of organic molecules, internal moulds, and penetrating
forces, Maupertuis’s accounts of embryogenesis, and Buffon’s attempt to reframe
natural history as a historical and explanatory science.
Chapter 3 exploits the results of the first two chapters by documenting how some of
the key figures and topics treated in these chapters influenced Kant’s early writings. It
shows that cosmological theories of Maupertuis and Buffon informed Kant’s cosmog-
ony contained in his Universal Natural History of 1755, and that Buffon’s Natural
History provided the model for Kant’s lectures on physical geography of 1757. In
addition, Buffon and Maupertuis are shown to have shaped Kant’s discussion of bio-
logical origin in The Only Possible Argument of 1763, as well as his views on hylozoism
formulated in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766). The discussion of Kant’s precritical
writings is crisp and clear, and Mensch persuasively argues that eighteenth-century
naturalists significantly impacted Kant’s early philosophical development.
In the remaining chapters, which document Kant’s philosophical development up
to the Critique of Pure Reason, Mensch develops her core argument. Chapter 4 is
devoted to Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation (1770) and the famous letter to Herz of
1772, in which Kant announces his ‘Critical Turn’. The chapter nicely highlights
Kant’s focus on investigations into the origin of cognitions in these writings. Rejecting
Leibniz’s innatism, according to which—to use the biological analogy—ideas preexist
or lie preformed in the mind, as well as Locke’s empiricist account of the origin of
ideas, Kant treated the concepts of space and time and the pure concepts of the intel-
lect as ‘originally acquired’ concepts generated by the mind itself (78). The model for
this account of the origin of concepts, Mensch argues, was epigenesis, a theory Kant
used to expound his views on the generation of cognition. Just as the theory of
epigenesis stressed the self-formative nature of organism, so, similarly, Kant stressed
that pure intellectual concepts are novel products formed by reason understood as a
spontaneous and organizing faculty.
Chapter 5 treats some of Kant’s writings in the period from 1770 to 1781 and con-
tains an instructive comparison of Kant’s 1775 essay on race and theories of biological
variation proposed by Maupertuis and Buffon. Chapter 6 analyses Kant’s metaphysics
lectures and his reception of Tetens’s Essays on Human Nature (1777). It shows that the
study of Tetens’s psychological work led Kant to explicate the difference between
investigations into the origin of cognition and transcendental investigations into the






























cognition remained central to Kant’s philosophy, as is shown in chapter 7. This chapter
focuses on the Critique of Pure Reason. It aims to establish that Kant’s transcendental
investigations into the presuppositions of knowledge are based on what Mensch calls
genealogical investigation into the origin of cognitions. To support this claim, Kant’s
transcendental deduction and his deduction of the ideas of reason are interpreted as
arguments that necessarily involve accounts of the genesis of categories and ideas.
The book ends with an epilogue that summarizes some key aspects of Kant’s views
on natural history, a 20-page bibliography, and a convenient index.
I thoroughly enjoyed reading Kant’s Organicism. It is the result of thorough scholar-
ship and Mensch’s attempt to interpret Kant’s transcendental philosophy in relation to
the eighteenth-century life sciences is original and exciting. My main criticism of the
book is that, at times, its main thesis is insufficiently supported by close analyses of
Kant’s technical arguments in the first Critique. Let me give one example to illustrate
this point: Mensch’s discussion of Kant’s deduction of the ideas of reason (‘soul’,
‘world’, and ‘God’). Mensch correctly stresses that Kant wished to explain the
genesis of these transcendent ideas. However, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant
argues that the origin of the ideas of reason can be traced to the form of syllogisms
studied in logic. By relating, in a murky and much debated way, the ideas of ‘soul’,
‘world’, and ‘God’ to the forms of categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms,
Kant argues that these ideas are grounded in the nature of reason. If this is the case, one
may expect that a proper understanding of Kant’s views on the origin of ideas requires
a study of the eighteenth-century logic. It is not immediately clear what a study of
eighteenth-century biology and epigenesis adds to our understanding of Kant’s deduc-
tion of the ideas of reason. Since Mensch does not discuss Kant’s technical argument in
detail, I was, at least in this case, not persuaded by her claim that Kant’s use of biologi-
cal models had a ‘deep methodological impact’ on his transcendental philosophy and
constitute more than a merely ‘metaphorical appeal’ (144).
Notwithstanding this criticism, Kant’s Organicism is a very welcome addition to
Kant scholarship. The book is concise, well written, and, generally speaking, Mensch
nicely explains complex theories and arguments in very elegant prose. She is at her
best as an intellectual historian. I was impressed with the historical scholarship and
the way in which she meticulously demonstrates the extensive impact of eighteenth-
century naturalists on Kant’s philosophical development. Finally, Mensch convin-
cingly shows that questions concerning the origin of cognitions strongly informed
Kant’s philosophy. This result is important, since many scholars, often operating in
the wake of Peter F. Strawson’s analytic Kant interpretation, have ignored these type
of questions when studying Kant. In short: Mensch’s book is a good example of the
fruitful integration of Kant studies with history of science.
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